Leicester

The demand for troops from Leicester in 1322 came in the context of Edward II's struggle with "contrariant" barons led by the mighty Thomas of Lancaster, who happened to be the lord of Leicester. This was not the first time Leicester had been drawn into such a struggle, for one of its previous earls had been Simon de Montfort. On both occasions the consequence of being on the losing side led to the borough being forfeited to the king, and the townsmen burdened with a heavy fine. No wonder then that borough authorities often preferred to temporize, if they could, and avoid over-committing themselves.

Most of the burgesses of Leicester are unlikely to have felt any special commitment to their overlord, beyond what was politically expedient. That expediency was reflected in the periodic gifts of money or food and drink they sent him and his steward of Leicester, as well as in troops provided on occasion: in 1312, for example, they sent 20 archers to help with the earl's pursuit of Piers Gaveston, the king's favourite. We can expect that these necessary evidences of loyalty were countered by resentment felt about the involvement of the earl's officials in local government, and the financial demands of the lordship on community resources. After the fall of Earl Thomas, the king invited petitions of grievances against him; one was drawn up by the Leicester authorities accusing the men to whom the earl had farmed the borough of extortionate practices; in their effort to make a profit from the arrangement, the farmers (or their officers) had, it was alleged, imposed unprecedented licence fees on those involved in the weaving, fulling, or sale of cloth (a major element of the town's economy), as well as new tolls on fish brought to the town for sale.

In 1322 Earl Thomas was expecting support from Leicester for his faction's cause, while the king expected support for his; both were sending messengers to the borough, doubtless with demands to that effect. The borough authorities were also sending messengers to the earl, at least, although we cannot be sure whether this related to the conflict. In mid-January the earl sent a letter, via Sir William Trussel, asking that an embassy of leading townsmen be sent to Tutbury to confer with him. When they arrived, however, they found not the earl but only one of his lieutenants. Nervous, and probably aware that things were not going well for the earl (for the authorities were also keeping in touch with the king's party, whose forces were gathering to move against the Contrariants), the embassy declined to discuss matters and returned home. The earl resorted to threats. At first he ordered that the townsmen place themselves under Sir William's command – the mayor was placatory but apparently non-committal; then the earl ordered his steward to muster all suitable men of the town and its surrounding hamlets to come to his castle at Pontefract, ostensibly to fight against the Scots, but really to support Lancaster against the king. The mayor gave the steward a monetary gift to win his favour in the recruitment process (perhaps to avoid any of the city leaders being selected), and continued to keep in touch with both factions.

Essentially, the Leicester authorities were trying to straddle the fence, negotiating concurrently with both sides on the matter of provision of military support. On February 21, for example, they discussed the matter over wine, in Walter de Busceby's tavern, with the steward and other members of the earl's household; one week later they were wining representatives of the king and Hugh Despenser. By the latter date, the earl was on the run and the king had called for a general muster. The contingent from Leicester was presumably for that; but the authorities were primarily concerned with convincing the king of the town's loyalty, in view of the reduced support it provided. By the end of February, Edward had brought his forces to Coventry – too close to Leicester for it to be safe for the townsmen to deny him.

Perhaps they had hoped to delay long enough that affairs would settle themselves without the involvement of a Leicester contingent; effort was made to keep informed about developing events. It appears that a fifty-man contingent was sent to join the king's army. It was presumably present at the battle of Boroughbridge (16 March 1322), where matters were resolved: the Lancastrian forces were soundly beaten and, as a result, Earl Thomas and other leading rebels were killed. We may note that the contingent's town-paid wages would not have sufficed to fund it through to the battle, and the king would not wish to have to take over payment. Yet unpaid soldiers could prove mutinous. Had there been any dispute over the payment of wages, and a consequent refusal of the Leicester soldiers to fight at Boroughbridge, this might help explain the king's subsequent punishment of Leicester; but that is purely speculative.

After his victory, the king came down to Leicester; one of his aims was to deal with the power-bases of his vanquished enemies. Edward had no reason to feel sympathetic towards the townsmen. Leicester had been one of Thomas of Lancaster's principal bases, for the earl had a castle there. Leicester men had helped in the fall of his friend Gaveston. And when, in 1318, the Contrariants had brought Edward to heel for a time, it had been at Leicester that an assembly of magnates had imposed terms on him, giving Lancaster all he had been aiming for in restricting royal authority. Furthermore, Leicester's half-heartedness in the military support it offered Edward in 1322 must be seen in the context of much more widespread reluctance to send troops to the king's aid (although Lancaster too had experienced difficulty in mustering support); Edward's wrath in regard to that may have been channelled at Leicester, which was close at hand. Possibly Edward also suspected the townsmen of sending military help to the earl at the same time. But, in imposing the large fine of £200; on Leicester, perhaps old grudges were less influential than the simple vengefulness and venality of the victors in the aftermath of Boroughbridge; Leicester had to pay for its unlucky association with the rebel leader. The fine might have been even heavier had not the authorities paid out money to have a word put in on their behalf by Edward's confessor.

In addition to the fine, Leicester's liberties were taken into the king's hand; this was associated with the forfeiture of Lancaster's possessions to the Crown. The king appointed representatives to take over the earl's various properties, and auditors of the accounts related to those lands. A custodian was appointed to administer the earl's lordship of Leicester. Decorating the town gates with the royal coat of arms was an acknowledgement of the change in lordship, and possibly intended to gratify Edward with a conspicuous demonstration of the townsmen's loyalty (although we cannot rule out the possibility that they simply replaced arms of the earl that may have previously decorated the gates). Normally, a town in the king's hand would have to pay a sizeable fine to regain its self-governing privileges. However, the prompt action taken by Leicester in paying, in the fortnight following Boroughbridge, suggests the fine was punitive, not associated with restoration of the liberties. Besides, the custodian is mentioned again a little later, although the infrequency of references hints that he may have been an absentee, with day-to-day administration remaining in the hands of the mayor. That included levying a "great tallage" to cover the costs of the fine and the troops sent into the field; or, probably more accurately, to reimburse whoever had advanced the money that was so promptly paid out (conceivably the mayor himself). Leicester's liberties may not have been reinstated until the town was restored to the earldom, in the person of Thomas of Lancaster's brother and heir, in 1324.

Whatever the reason for the fine, the mayor's account records a high level of activity, in terms of messengers to and from the king, in late March and early April. Some of this was likely related to Edward's summons of a parliament at York in May (at which he intended to overturn legislation his opponents had previously put in place to curb his power). Messengers continued to arrive periodically during the summer months, but by late May the matter at hand was the king's demand for Leicester to send soldiers to join an army heading into Scotland. On 20 May royal letters were sent off to several towns acknowledging their commitment of troops, identifying Newcastle-on-Tyne as the assembly point for the army, and requiring that the towns cover the expenses of their troops for a 40-day campaign (that is, the king was taking advantage of his supremacy at that time to flout the custom that he would pay such expenses once troops had joined the army). The contributing towns were:

Leicester's small contingent had been put together by 4 July, when ale was bought for them; such refreshment was repeated on 8 July (perhaps they were being outfitted or drilled), and they were finally despatched (after more ale) on 16 July, the mayor escorting them out of town to Redhill – location now unknown – where he gave them 2s. to pay for ale after the first day's journey, and sent them off. The soldiers received wages for 50 days – transit time plus the 40 days demanded by the king – at a rate of 4d. a day. The following year we hear of archers sent to the king – probably a group of similar size to that of July 1322, judging from the amount raised by taxation to cover their expenses.

The list of expenditures on the soldiers sent out in March and July shows that the burden on a borough's budget was not simply related to wages and living expenses of the troops for at least part of their period of service. Ensuring that they were provided with serviceable arms and armour and with transportation was another obligation. Equipment might need to be purchased, usually second-hand, or borrowed from townsmen (with an obligation to compensate if it were lost or damaged during operations), while towns occasionally had a small supply on-hand; another option was to give the soldiers a cash allowance and expected them to furnish their own weapons and mounts. In addition, there was the matter of identification of a contingent, in terms of pennants and uniforms; these were partly a matter of tactical necessity, and partly perhaps of civic dignity and pride. At this period, lack of regulation or standardization in uniforms meant that an army would comprise groups of soldiers with clothed in a variety of colours and styles, some of which might be similar to those of soldiers in the opposing army;

In the Middle Ages towns did not yet have their own coat of arms proper, although they had the beginnings of them, notably in the iconic imagery used on their common seals. Although precocious London used that type of emblem on its militia banner at an early period, most towns used simpler visual means of identification for their troops. This might be a particular colour or colour scheme for uniforms, and/or some kind of badge. When, in 1436, Salisbury prepared to send abroad a contingent of archers and men-at-arms, to help protect Calais against a siege, each of them was outfitted at city expense with some kind of coat which bore, on both front and back, a red cross with the letter S in blue. The Nottingham chamberlains' account for 1463/64 includes several expenses, totalling 56s.4d, in relation to the manufacture of jackets for troops to go to York to assist Edward IV, in the summer of 1464, against an active Lancastrian army. The size of the Nottingham force is not specified, but 9 yards of red cloth was purchased for the jackets, and a smaller amount of a better quality cloth (also red) for a jacket for the captain of the troops, who was one of the borough sheriffs; a yard of white fustian was bought, along with thread, and payments made for cutting out letters {presumably N) and attaching them to the jackets. The control of uniforms at company, rather than army, level created the risk of similar colours or decorations being worn by opponents, and a resulting confusion that could influence the outcome of a battle.

Coventry

If Leicester, through the accident of seigneurial association, was unlucky enough to be entangled in the civil war of Edward II's reign, Coventry found itself involved, probably reluctantly, in the Lancastrian-Yorkist conflict of the fifteenth century.

On the whole, towns were not heavily caught up in this power struggle within the nobility. In contrast to the castles where feuding nobles made their stands, almost no English town had to face a serious siege. Whereas the war in France was a war of territorial conquest necessitating that French towns be captured and held, during the Wars of the Roses – apart from a natural desire to control the capital and the major supply route of London-York, running through the Midlands, as well as to deny the enemy towns they might use as bases or strongholds – neither side had the means to seize and garrison towns for extended periods. Sieges were costly and time-consuming; the English rivals preferred just to fight it out. For assuring some measure of loyalty from towns, they relied more on having influential supporters within urban communities. Besides, most town walls were not strong enough to fend off for long an assault by a large and determined force that was well-equipped; although they were starting to accommodate artillery, relatively little was being done to modify them to resist it. And, during the fifteenth century many were falling into disrepair, with the notable exception of those in frontier areas still subject to attack by foreign enemies. Towns were consequently less valued as fortresses to be contested than as stopover points en route to or from some battle, providing billets and provisions, perhaps new recruits too, and occasionally refuge from pursuit. Urban authorities found it politic to offer hospitality rather than resistance, in the hope that armies would move on soon.

There were exceptions to these generalizations. Some towns were subject to pillaging as armies moved around the country. St. Albans had the misfortune to be caught smack-dab in the middle of one battle, in 1455, its streets and gardens the location of fighting, although not at all suitable for the deployment of troops. That was the confrontation to which Coventry was preparing to send the above contingent, but cancelled its plans upon hearing that the Lancastrians had already met defeat. Whereas Bristol allowed in a Lancastrian army without any resistance in1471, Gloucester (where the Lancastrians expected to find assistance) opted to hold out against it, having learned that Edward IV was en route with his own force, and its decision counteracted the Lancastrian advantage in taking Bristol; a royal pardon for choosing the wrong side had to be purchased by Bristol after the Yorkist victory at Tewkesbury. But it was London which had the greatest cause to fear assault, and which experienced some of the more serious attacks on urban defences: in 1460 when the Tower was besieged, and in May 1471 when a fleet anchored in the Thames attempted to take the city by force.

Midlands towns tended to be more involved in the Wars of the Roses than peripheral areas (such as East Anglia), because of their location in the interior, which was more likely to see troop movement, and because the Midlands was an area of Lancastrian support. Coventry's central position was strategically important, being in an area rich in food sources, within striking distance of London, and able to call for support from south, north, east and west. For a while, it was used as home base by the Lancastrian court. In the opening years of the 1450s, as political tension at the national level grew and threatened to deteriorate into civil war, the Coventry authorities paid a good deal of attention to defensive arrangements. St. Albans was the first of several battles for which there is record of the city sending troops. It also despatched 40 men to join the Lancastrian force defeated at Northampton in 1460. After the Yorkist loss at Wakefield (1461), where the duke of York was killed, Coventry was ordered to supply troops to the Lancastrians and defend the city against any other Yorkist forces. But with York's son, Edward, Earl of March, victorious at Mortimer's Cross immediately after, Coventry instead chose to open its gates to him, and provide archers for his march towards London; in coming months it supplied Edward IV with 100 men for the fight at Towton, and 40 for the earl of Warwick to pursue Queen Margaret and the Prince of Wales; 34 of the latter contingent returned to the city, having been away for longer than anticipated, and due additional wages.

With the fresh outbreak of war 1469-71, both sides again sought troops from Coventry. Edward IV asked for 100 archers to combat rebels in the north; the city sent only 50, offering them a good wage of 8d. for each of the 20 days they were expected to be away, but the men refused to serve for less than 10d. Another 50 men were sent to aid King Edward against Warwick, but the former lost and was brought prisoner to the city by the latter. Careful attention was once more being paid at this time to matters of defence, and changes in fortune were happening so fast and frequently that the town clerk had found it useful to begin chronicling matters such as who had the upper hand, who was in exile, who had been killed, etc.

In spring 1470 the city sent a continent to aid the resurgent king against Lincolnshire rebels. At the same time the duplicitous Warwick made Coventry his base of operations for a brief period, until he learned of his rebel allies' defeat. He then fled south (aiming for France), and Coventry put together another 40-man company to help the king pursue him. Yet another contingent, of the same size, was sent to Nottingham in August, when the king was preparing to resist Warwick's expected return. When Warwick launched his invasion, it was to Coventry he first brought his army, which the city chronicler described as 30,000 strong (such estimations are suspected, and in some cases proven, to be heavily exaggerated) . It was Edward's turn to flee the country. By 1471 Coventry soldiers were demanding 12d. a day and city collectors were having difficulties raising contributions to cover the costs.

Now it was Warwick who was to be the beneficiary of a contingent from the city (again 40 men), purportedly for a two-month expedition to Flanders, although the distribution of ordnance to men charged with defending the city gates suggests that the real intent was to resist the inevitable return of Edward and his supporters. The supposed expedition never took place, but the invasion by Edward did. When his army appeared before the city gates, Warwick (hoping for reinforcements to an already strong garrison) refused to come out and fight; the Yorkists lacked the resources and opportunity for a prolonged siege and after a few days withdrew. They returned later, but still Warwick stayed within the safety of Coventry's walls, which were relatively new; and evidently well-maintained, even if the circuit was not yet complete; again the Yorkists had neither the time nor the expendable manpower to waste in a siege, and they set off to take possession of London. Warwick had neglected to provide sufficiently for London's defence and was forced to pursue; he was accompanied by 20 foot-soldiers and 20 horsemen supplied by the Coventry authorities. They were presumably with the earl at his final defeat at Barnet.

We cannot easily tell whether Coventry genuinely favoured Warwick (or, rather, the Lancastrian horse he backed at the end), or simply felt it had no choice but to provide him with support. It now sought to win its way back into Edward's good graces with a loan of money and a modest contingent of troops, who may have participated in the defeat of the remaining Lancastrian forces at Tewkesbury (1471). Edward's anger over the protection Warwick had found in Coventry was not to be quelled so easily. As had happened earlier with Leicester, the city's liberties were suspended, and £200 had to be paid to have them restored and a royal pardon issued to the citizens. That Lancastrian sympathies continued to flourish amongst some in the city is suggested by royal letters in February and December 1472 ordering that inhabitants be prevented from wearing liveries of other lords, that anyone spreading seditious rumours was to be reported to the king, and that those refusing to pay the king's taxes or otherwise resisting authority were to be imprisoned and sent before the king.

Although the years that followed were fortunately quieter, the city authorities' approach of trying to keep in with both sides continued up to 1485, when troops were sent to aid Richard III at Bosworth, but Henry VII was given a princely welcome into the city shortly after his victory there.

York too had aided the Kingmaker during his period of dominance, having earlier provided support to the Lancastrians. After 1471, however, when the Duke of Gloucester had command in the north, the city looked to him for good lordship and loyally provided him with troops on several occasions.

Loyalties, leadership, and recruitment

The Wars of the Roses were primarily a conflict within the aristocratic warrior class. Particular townsmen could be implicated because of personal feelings or loyalties stemming from bastard feudalism – many borough ordinances of this period (echoing national statute) urged their citizens not to accept livery from any lord, nor place any outside interests before those of their town – and at times the community as a whole could be aroused to express support for one party or another, such as after the second battle of St. Albans (1461) when the Londoners, disgusted with the rapacious behaviour (or at least rumours thereof) of Queen Margaret's army of northerners and fearing themselves next in line, closed their gates against it, and instead allowed the earls of March and Warwick entrance. But overall the corporate policy was (not explicitly, but evidently) to avoid making a long-term enemy of whoever was going to govern the country. It is not easy to say whether particular towns had any sincere and long-standing sympathies with one faction or another; they bent with the wind, keeping local best interests in the forefront, although occasionally we see indications of divided loyalties within the urban ruling class. Although Coventry offered lavish hospitality to Henry VI and his queen before there was open warfare, it expected that cultivating the relationship would work to its benefit. Nonetheless, in February 1460 Henry had cause to complain that there were those in Coventry who favoured his enemies and were spreading disaffection in the city.

In such conditions of uncertainty, it was wise to keep in touch with both sides (as Leicester had done in 1322) and to seek reliable information regarding any rumours or unofficial reports that came in, so as to know which side had the upper hand or had forces active in the region. For example, the financial account of the bailiffs of Shrewsbury in 1459 includes several payments to representatives despatched:

• to try to verify rumours about hostilities between the king and the duke of York;
• to find out more about a reported battle at which the earl of Salisbury's forces had killed many opponents, and ascertain where he was headed next;
• to speak to the king at Nottingham and bring back his written instructions;
• to take letters to the duke of York and bring back his response;
• to gather information from various places concerning the confrontation at Worcester between the king and his enemies.

The nervousness of Shrewsbury authorities is also evidenced by expenditures on repairs and improvements to the walls and gates, and arrangements for watches at the latter. To commit too heavily to the losing side could bring penalties. Having gathered their intelligence, the Shrewsbury authorities sent 61 soldiers to Henry VI's aid at Northampton, although the wages paid out suggest they may not have stayed there long enough to participate in the Lancastrian defeat the following year.

Despite the medieval tradition of military leadership from the nobility, towns – preferring to be as free of seigneurial control as possible – tended to seek captains for their troops elsewhere. While London, in the period after and perhaps before the Conquest, looked to noblemen for this, during the Late Middle Ages towns mostly rejected such entanglements. Although we do occasionally find members of the gentry involved with urban military affairs, captaincy of local troops was more likely to be given over to the more appropriate borough officials, such as constables (e.g. Norwich, sheriffs (e.g. Nottingham, see above), aldermen or sergeants (e.g. York). Coventry's captain William Tybaud appears to fall into the last of those categories, if we may identify him with the William Tibottes who was in the post of sword-bearer by 1455 (when his salary was raised) and still therein in 1480; it looks to have been an appointment for life. Presumably such were chosen because men whose ability (perhaps particularly in terms of strength or fighting prowess and force of personality) and reliability were known. They could be trusted, better than an outsider, to have the best interests of their town in mind; this included keeping the troops under control and ensuring their behaviour did not discredit the town. When, in 1470, Coventry sent a contingent to aid Edward IV, under the command of the mayor's sergeant, William Shyppey, the soldiers were required to swear an oath to obey their captain and not to quarrel amongst themselves.

From about the mid-fourteenth century, the Crown was increasingly relying, for troops for overseas service, on contracts with captains commissioned to recruit mercenary companies in England; and in the fifteenth this was applied to forces required for civil war, with the development that many captains were indentured retainers of the leading nobles, whose duties included the recruitment of retinues for military service. In 1480 the Coventry authorities were approached by a Sir Thomas Everyngham. who was putting together a thousand-man company to fight in Burgundy; he wanted to recruit some of these from Coventry: servants wishing to leave their employ (regardless of the wishes of their masters) as well as men imprisoned for debt or as disturbers of the peace unable to put up bonds for good behaviour. But because Sir Thomas had no supporting documentation, and because uncertain whether it was sensible to allow so many to leave at a time when relations with Scotland were worsening, the mayor wrote to the king's council for guidance. The city authorities had reason to be cautious. In July 1469, Edward IV, faced by a rebellion among his former supporters in the north, issued commissions of array, including to Coventry, from which he requested 100 archers. A day after his letter arrived at the city, another came from the Earl of Warwick, asking for as many men as they could raise – ostensibly to take them to the king, but more likely to join up with the rebels, with whom Warwick was in league. A second from Edward, a few days later, suggests he suspected Warwick's duplicity, for he ordered the Coventry authorities not to allow any of the citizens to join any force except under orders that bore his personal signature or one of his seals. In 1480, however, the king's reply vouched for Sir Thomas and asked the authorities to assist him in finding capable archers and foot-soldiers, but excluding felons or convicted criminals from the pool of candidates.

This shift did not completely undermine the value of local levies. Calling on regional and local communities to supply troops was a long-established and well-understood system; with the Crown unable to afford a standing army, this system persisted throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. But commissions of array and even requests or demands for troops made directly by royal letter, could prove a slow and unreliable process; even in the case of communities that responded positively, raising, outfitting, and despatching forces took time, and troops on the road might be tardy. Yet, while townsmen may not have been the best troops available, if they answered your summons, at least they were not with your enemy. The downside of a military recruitment system reliant, at least partially, on community levies – which entailed mandatory possession of arms and armour, martial sports, and periodic musters and militaristic parades – was that it fostered a culture of combat, placed ample weaponry at street level, and gave scope for private disputes or public discontent to be vented through armed violence or uprising. In doing so it placed more strain on the administration of the Peace.