DISCUSSION

It will be noted that this document refers to the practice of law as a craft (mestier) rather than a profession, placing it on a par with other trades and crafts in contrast to the predominant twentieth century view of lawyers as members of a profession, with a superior social standing to those who using manual skills. Even this recognition of the craft of attorneys – probably not intended to imply any organized gild – was a step in the direction of professionalization, however. Yet, while this document indicates awareness that the practice of law required special training, this does not in itself imply professionalism in the fullest sense that we use the term today. In essence, the document's concerns could be reduced to the concern – seen repeatedly in borough ordinances regulating craft gilds – that unskilled practitioners would bring disrepute to the craft as a whole, and offered unfair competition to the skilled, established practitioners.

London's courts, because of their number and the early development of a fairly elaborate bureaucracy, attracted specialized lawyers from a relatively early date, but (as the document suggests) without blocking the activity of men whom we might describe today as "para-legals". Doubtless influenced by the nearby royal courts, London increasingly passed ordinances defining the practice of law in its courts, and specifying who was qualified to practice it.

The overall image from the reform document translated here is that the courts had become something of a circus, with unqualified men hanging around the courthouses to sell their services to parties in lawsuits, then acting outside of established court procedures, trying to exert undue influence over judges by having private words with them in court, and raising objections to recorded evidence or to judgements that went against their clients. Some were also capitalizing on the tendency to use litigation as a pressure tactic in business dealings or even as a means of speculation – introducing a volume of pleas in the anticipation that the income from victories or out-of-court settlements would exceed the costs of losses – by partnering with such plaintiffs (perhaps even inciting men to introduce such frivolous suits). Another abuse revealed by the document seems to have been a countor acting for both sides in the same plea, or accepting a bribe from the opposing party to sabotage his client's case, or even taking one party's case (and fee) and, having familiarized himself with the arguments for that party, switching sides to give the other party an advantage and himself a second fee; these of course being serious perversions of justice, and punished accordingly.

This could not have done much to enhance the reputation of lawyers, who were already the subject of distrust. In certain cases, notably that governed by the law merchant, lawyers were not normally allowed to take part, it being felt that the facts should speak for themselves and not be subject to the convoluted arguments of lawyers. And there were several largely unsuccessful attempts to prohibit the election of lawyers as parliamentary representatives.

A countor was a certain category of those whom are today called barristers or lawyers, i.e. they pleaded court cases on behalf of clients pursuing or defending a legal suit. The name, which was the one most commonly used in the thirteenth century for representatives of litigants, originates from the fact that they counted (argued) counts, i.e. accounts – although whether in the sense of a narration of the events (as the Latin equivalent, narrator suggests), or the sense of a demand that one person account to another for some alleged injury (there being some indication of a link of the term to the Latin computarium), is not clear.

Several categories of men engaging in legal practice, at some level, are seen in the document: sergeants, attorneys, countors, pleaders, essoiners, and assessors. Whether or to what extent these categories may have overlapped is uncertain, although the document itself envisages distinctions. Certainly at a later date sergeants represented the highest level (the pool from which professional justices were chosen), years of service as an attorney prepared one to be a sergeant, and countors appear to have been a level lower than attorneys; pleaders were perhaps men of even lesser experience (Riley suspected they were at the apprenticeship level). Essoiners provided a specialized service (see notes below). Assessors were apparently individuals present in the court whom the presiding officer might invite to advise him on an appropriate sentence – hence perhaps the notion that sentences were passed by the community. It would still be a few years before London had its first known public prosecutor, the Common Sergeant, and its first expert legal advisor, the Recorder.