DISCUSSION
The idea that those wrongly accused of a crime could appeal to 
divine justice by seeking sanctuary at sacred places existed in some 
pre-Christian societies, particularly those with underdeveloped 
juridical systems.  Christianity added the concepts that all law derived 
from God (who was therefore the ultimate source of justice and mercy) 
and that sinners could be redeemed through repentance.  From the 
fourth century, bishops were accorded some rights to intervene in 
civil trials and to request pardons or sentence reductions for criminals.  
At the Council of Orange (432) a territorial dimension was added, by 
the decision that the sanctity of churches demanded that anyone taking 
refuge there could not be delivered up to the authorities.  From 
the beginning secular authorities tried to place restrictions on 
the right of sanctuary, and occasionally violated it.
In Anglo-Saxon England the purpose of sanctuary was to allow criminals 
a limited amount of time to negotiate monetary compensation in lieu 
of corporal punishment.  Habitual criminals, or those already convicted 
of a crime, were not intended to benefit.  The Danish and the Norman kings 
continued their Anglo-Saxon predecessors' respect of sanctuary.  It 
was not until the twelfth century, however, that sanctuary became 
bound up with a new procedure: abjuration of the realm, whereby 
criminals were allowed to confess their sins and go into exile, in 
return for their lives being spared.  This procedure, perhaps influenced 
by outlawry (itself a form of exile from society), was a compromise 
solution to the stalemate in which the secular authorities needed 
to punish criminals, but the Church had the obligation to defend 
the sanctity of its territory.
By the late Middle Ages, sanctuary had become a thorn in the side of 
the developing legal system.  The period of sanctuary was, in theory, 
limited to forty days, after which the refugee was supposed either 
to surrender to the authorities or abjure.  However, after the 
forty days had elapsed, authorities were at a loss to know what to do, 
except to keep a guard on the church in which sanctuary had been 
taken.  The parish whose members had to undertake this guard duty 
found it burdensome, not least because they were subject to fine in 
the event of escapes, which were not uncommon.  For habitual criminals 
escape may have been preferred to abjuring, in itself a punitive procedure 
risking murder en route to exile and little future prospects in 
the place of exile.  Furthermore, the prospect of sanctuary was believed 
to be encouraging crime in urban areas, where churches were numerous:  
debtors used it as a means of evading creditors, thieves used sanctuaries 
as bases for nightly raids, convicted criminals who escaped from prison 
often headed for churches.  Occasionally frustrated authorities entered 
churches to drag criminals out to punishment, some incidents turning 
so violent that church-state relations were strained as a result.  
Where criminals survived their forced removal, the Church insisted on 
them being returned to sanctuary.
Margery Ludlow, along with Robert Phylipson's sister who also sent 
a similar petition to the king, had cause to expect support from 
the king  although we do not know the outcome of this case.  
Henry VII was unsympathetic to sanctuary rights;  his son restricted 
sanctuary to a limited number of places and substituted a form of 
imprisonment for abjuration.